Russia. Only those natives guilty of rebellion or the murder of Russian officials and officers can be sentenced to death by the rope or by shooting by court-martial instituted each time 'ad hoc'. The decisions at these court-martials, which always consist of five army officers and an auditor, must still be confirmed by the Governor General. During my fifteen years in Tashkent, there were only three such cases, of which the first two occurred during the Kokand uprising in 1876. This is an honorable record for the Russians and the natives alike. 681 [687] [694]

9. System of Instruction.

The system of instruction among the sedentary population of Turkestan is highly developed and the number of schools is very /219/ large, although education is a private matter, and the native governments provide neither for the erection of schools nor for the salaries of teachers. In Turkestan there are two classes of schools, elementary schools or 'mekhtebes', and higher schools or medreses. 871●

The teachers in the elementary schools are mullahs, just as in the higher schools. In each elementary school there is only one teacher who instructs the students of all ages in one and the same place. These teachers receive no fixed salary. Their entire income consists in the school fees which the students bring them voluntarily, which, however, are never more than a mark a year at most, and in occasional gifts of provisions, which they receive every Thursday, and festive clothes which they receive from the parents of their students at the time of the high Moslem festivals. There is a special custom that the father of a boy presents the teacher with a khalat when the boy has progressed far enough to start reading the Koran. 872 875

There are no real schoolhouses. In winter instruction is held either in the dwelling of the teacher, in an ordinary, unheated, windowless chamber, lighted only by the open door, or, if the teacher does not have a large enough place at his disposal it is held in the appropriate mosque. 872

In summer, on the contrary, the instruction is usually held outside on a veranda, in a shaded courtyard or in a garden. School attendance is not obligatory, as a result of which the schools are frequented primarily only by the children of the rich. The majority of the students are boys, but there are some girls among them, especially from the better classes, who receive elementary education as well.

871 The Russians have changed nothing with regard to the system of instruction in the old institutions in their Central Asian possessions. They /228/ built, it is true, at their own expense a number of Russian elementary schools and high schools; these are, however, primarily intended for the children of the Russian settlers, soldiers, officials and officers. The relatively small number of Russian schools attended by the natives, particularly by the Kazakhs, serve above all for the training of interpreters in the various administrative offices, for only a few of the Russian officials serving in Turkestan are familiar with the native languages. Highly commendable was the erection of Russian aul /pastoral-village/ schools for the nomads, who in their wandering way
875 of life had formerly been unable to send their children to school. The teachers for the aul schools are trained for their calling in a Tashkent training college for teachers; they must have mastered Russian and the and the native languages, and are divided among the various nomad auls, to accompany them in their wanderings and during that time to instruct the children of the members of the aul in the first principles and in the Russian language. It will be evident that the life of such a nomadic schoolmaster, especially if he is of European origin, is not exactly enviable, from what I have said above /in section of book not translated/ about the way of life of the nomads, especially when one considers that the salary of an aul school teacher is only fifty to seventy marks a month.

10. Dwellings.

342 The characteristic family relationships and the complete seclusion of the women from the world of men demand a special consruction and arrangement of the dwelling houses completely differing from our
[427] own. In Turkestan each house is established only for one single family, and the institution of rented houses or even furnished rooms is com-
[574] pletely unknown. If a strange guest comes to a house owner, the latter gives over to him his whole house together with furniture and servants for the length of his stay, and meanwhile seeks shelter with his family or with some one of his relatives if he does not have a second house in reserve for such occasions.

The houses are all built in the same style, and the dwellings of the rich differ from those of the poor only in the more spacious courtyards and gardens, the greater height of the walls, the larger number of rooms, the more artistic execution and the better construction material. The main point in the dwelling of each sedentary

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

and relegate Turkic to the status of a peasant dialect devoid of political importance.[8]

This policy of linguistic Russification is far more subtle than that practiced by the tsarist regime in some of its borderlands during the darkest days of modern Russian autocracy (1881–1903), and, if successful, could deal a very considerable blow to Muslim prospects in Central Asia. Thirty-five years is admittedly too short a time to judge the effects of a set of measures apparently designed to operate for several generations; but certain evidence permits us to draw some conclusions about its efficacy and prospects of success.

Soviet linguistic policies seem to have had very little effect on the speech habits of the bulk of the Muslim *rural* population. Living in their own fairly closed communities, which offer little continuous contact with Russians, the Muslim peasants continue to use exclusively their local dialects. They seem to be as ignorant of Russian as their ancestors had been. None of the peasants interviewed knew more than a few words of Russian; after ten years in Germany several could speak better German than they could Russian after several decades of residence in the Soviet Union. For most of the rural Muslims in the USSR, the first important contact with Russians and the Russian language comes with entrance into military service. After being drafted they are distributed among Russian soldiers and are expected to learn the language as best they can. For many of them, the military service is the first and most efficient school of Russian.

The situation is somewhat different in the cities and small towns, where Muslims live side by side with Russians, and where a large proportion of Muslim youths attend high schools and institutions of higher learning. It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of the linguistic training in Central Asia, because it varies from area to area and from time to time. If there is a general principle, it seems to consist in a direct correlation between level of education and Russian language instruction. In the elementary schools, the instruction is predominantly in the prevailing local language, either Turki or Russian, and in areas where both groups are numerous, in both. In the secondary schools Russian is either the principal language of instruction (in schools attended largely by Russian students) or else it is taught

[8] An alternate interpretation of Soviet linguistic policies in Central Asia is suggested by a British authority, G. E. Wheeler: "[The Soviet authorities] evidently hope to achieve by russification an effect similar to that produced by the 'Arabization' of the indigenous languages of the peoples who came under Arab Islamic domination. The adoption of the Arabic script and of numerous Arabic words and phrases was a powerful factor in the perpetuation of Islam, and thus of Arab culture, even after the tide of Arab conquest had receded. But it was the *result* of conversion to Islam, not the cause, and while the Arabs may have insisted on the use of Arabic for official purposes, just as Tsarist Russia and Britain insisted on the use of Russian and English, there is no evidence that they ever instituted a policy of Arabization of existing languages. The Soviet government is attempting to achieve the same end by arbitrary means: it is insisting on the russification of Central Asian languages by the introduction of the Cyrillic script and Russian loanwords; and it even envisages the modification of grammar and phonetics." G. E. Wheeler, "Cultural Developments in Soviet Central Asia," *Royal Central Asian Journal*, vol. 41 (July–Oct. 1954), p. 181.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL] Turkestan RL]

as an important second (but "foreign") language; passing a Russian language examination seems to be a graduation prerequisite for all high-school students, regardless of nationality. Every graduate of a Soviet high school is thus expected to possess a knowledge of Russian. Whether or not this knowledge actually exists probably depends more on what the student does after graduation than upon the intensity or quality of his training. For the average Muslim girl who marries a Muslim and then raises a family, her high-school Russian language instruction is wasted, for at home she speaks her native tongue and soon forgets all she has learned; the same is probably true of the Muslim youth who returns to the village after his studies. For the more enterprising wage earner, however, the Russian training is of greater and more lasting importance: it represents the key to all further academic or professional advancement, as well as to membership in the vast party and state apparatus, which comprise and circumscribe a "career" in Soviet society.[1]

At one time the Communists made serious attempts in the direction of founding university-level training in the native languages, but these endeavors were not very successful, in part because of the shortage of qualified native teaching personnel and in part as a result of the general trend in the direction of Russification. Today most of the university-level instruction, except that which by its very content requires the use of local languages (Central Asian archeology, anthropology, philology, folklore, etc.), appears to be conducted in Russian.

A young Muslim, in order to succeed in life, must learn Russian and learn it well. Among the Muslim intelligentsia, therefore, a knowledge of Russian is widespread. But — and this is essential for the present inquiry — by acquiring a knowledge of Russian the local Muslims do not, as is apparently anticipated by the regime, lose command of their own language; instead, they become bilingual. Russian is the language of business, and the means through which it is possible to establish some contact with the culture of the outside world; it is not the language of daily life, in use at home, in the family, and among friends. The refugee informants were unanimous in asserting that neither they nor their friends, even those active in the Party, ever spoke Russian elsewhere than at work. They were equally firm in maintaining that they knew no Muslims who had lost command of their native speech. This assertion is reinforced by the observation that the Muslim refugees in Germany do not communicate

[1] According to the *Central Asian Review*, admission to the State University of Turkmenia and the Turkmen Academy of Sciences is "dependent upon students passing an examination in Russian and Russian literature." On the other hand, "Russian students at the Academy of Sciences are only required to have a knowledge of the Turkmen language if they intend to make a special study of Turkmen language and literature." There is no reason to suppose that the pattern is different in the other republics of Central Asia. *Central Asian Review*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1953), pp. 65–66.

5: Pipes S-4 (1953) 1955 RL1 Turkestan RL1

Social contact, too, seems to be limited, even among the groups which by virtue of their occupation are constantly in touch with representatives of other nationalities. Muslim refugees who had been employed in Soviet agencies and offices together with Russians were unanimous in asserting that contact with the Russians ceased after working hours. Much the same seems to be the case among soldiers on active service in peace time. 563

Russo-Muslim relations vary considerably, depending upon the social status and level of education of the groups concerned. On the whole, the interviews indicate that national friction is in an inverse ratio to social status and education: the higher the status, the less friction. Racial hostility appears strongest among the poorest rural inhabitants, among the plain soldiers, and the unskilled laborers; it seems least prevalent among the intelligentsia, the state and party officials, the well-to-do peasants and workers, and the army officers. By and large the refugees — despite their strong anti-Russian bias — agreed that the relations between Russians and Muslims are good, and they attached little significance to various incidents of national friction which, being prompted, they had been able to recall. There seems to be a deep-seated feeling that whatever the differences dividing them, both these groups suffer from the same regime, that they are "in the same boat." 563 565

In the universities, *vuzy*, *tekhnikums*, and other places where work is combined with residence, Muslims and Russians frequently tend to separate from each other on their own initiative. A number of refugees reported that Muslim and Russian students, when given the choice, preferred to live in separate dormitories. 563 871

The greatest single Russifying force in the Soviet Union is the army. In the 1920's, in the initial stage of the Soviet nationality policy, the Communists had created separate military divisions for the major nationality groups in the USSR. These units were gradually broken up in the early 1930's, first by withdrawing regiments and battalions from their national commands and dispersing them among other regular Soviet divisions, and then by disbanding their commanding staffs as well. From then until World War II there were no separate national units. At one time in the course of World War II, when Soviet military fortunes were at their nadir, attempts were made to create separate all-Muslim units in Turkestan, possibly to serve as Home Guards. However, as soon as the Soviet army began to gain the initiative at the front, the formation of these units was suspended, and its personnel was eventually dispersed in the regular Red army. Since the 1930's the army has scattered Muslim draftees throughout regular Soviet units in such a manner that no more than a few Muslims are assigned to any one infantry company; Muslim officers, too, are distributed as thinly as possible. 701 563 177

Naturally, such a system does not permit Muslim recruits to maintain

361 on the borders, and as friendly relations be-
438 tween neighbors are confirmed. (1)

361 1. Here are the prices for certain
435 articles on the Vernyy market:

A kul' (mat bag) of rye flour (weighing 324 lbs) costs 4 rubles, 25 kopecks; a kul' of wheat flour weighing the same costs 4 rubles, 64 kopecks; For grinding rye or wheat they charge 2 2/3 kopecks; 36 lb of rice costs 2 rubles, 47 kopecks; 6 bushels (weighing 198 lb.) of oats costs 2 rubles, 84 kopecks; 36 lb. of hay costs 18 kopecks; 36 lb. of beef is 2 rubles, 13 kopecks; mutton is 1 ruble, 73 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of cow butter is 12 rubles, 24 kopecks; fresh fish is 2 rubles, 3 kopecks for 36 lb.; 36 lb. of salt costs 70 kopecks; stearine candles are 17 rubles, 56 kopecks for 36 lb.; tallow candles are 5 rubles, 84 kopecks for 36 lb.; /427/ 6 ft. of short firewood costs 4 rubles, 13 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of wine costs 6 rubles, 55 kopecks; 3¼ gal. of alcohol is 13 rubles, 11 kopecks; 36 lb. of copper is 10 rubles, 20 kopecks; 36 lb. of iron bars costs 4 rubles, 70 kopecks.

361 The daily wages of a worker are:
465 on foot, 35 kopecks; with a horse, 1 ruble, 10 kopecks; with a pair of oxen, 1 ruble, 75 kopecks.

361 /427/ Education in Vernyy has made cer-
871 tain advances. Here there are the following schools and educational institutions:

1) elementary school in Almata station,

361 at which 175 boys and 39 girls are enrolled.
871

2) elementary school in the Almata settlement, where 45 boys are enrolled.

3) a Moslem school in the Tatar suburb, with 40 pupils, taught by a mullah.

4) a trade school with 21 pupils, who learn various trades in addition to reading and writing.

5) a school of gardening with 21 pupils, who study with an experienced gardener from the Crimea.

6) A classical preparatory school for girls.

7) A classical preparatory school for boys.

Children of the privileged estate as well as the Cossack estate may enter the elementary schools and the trade school, although the number of the former is not large.

361 In 1878 at the Military Club quite a
217 good library was established, which now contains 2,000 volumes on various subjects. There is a marked trend among the population to use books from this library. From August 5, 1878 to April 5, 1879, i.e., in a period of 8 months, there were 1,474 recipients to whom 2,749 books were distributed.

[Kuldja] RL1

361
435 Tent cloth is sold at 30 kopecks for 2 ft. (per arshin) and calico for from 25 to 35 kopecks for 2 ft. (one arshin).

A cow costs from 16 to 25 rubles. A horse costs from 20 to 60 rubles. A sheep costs 3 rubles and a bull from 25 to 40 rubles.

A beam of wood 14 in. (8 vershoks) in diameter and 14 ft. (2 sazhen's) long costs 2 rubles. A board 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide and 6 ft. (2½ arshins) long costs 10 kopecks. A board 7 ft. (3 arshins) long and 14 in. (8 vershoks) wide costs 50 kopecks.

Fire brick costs 2 rubles a thousand, and sun-dried brick 1 ruble 60 kopecks. An unskilled workman is paid 15 kopecks a day; a worker with a horse receives from 40 kopecks to 1 ruble daily.

361
871 Education in Kuldja is shown by the following figures for schools and the number of pupils enrolled in them:

	No. schools	No. of pupils		Total
		Boys	Girls	
At the Chinese temple	1	25	-	25
At the great Moslem mosque	1	60	10	70
At the houses of the mullahs	4	82	21	103
Total	6	167	31	198

/437/ The population of Kuldja has quite a gentle and peaceful character.

361 there are 510 stalls and dukans, in the second
366 280. On ordinary /448/ days the bazaar stalls are closed for the most part. They are all open on bazaar days, however, of which there are three a week in Khodzhent: Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. There are 5 caravansaries in Khodzhent, of which 4 are Sart, none is European and 1 is Hindu.

361 There are 24 medresses, and 530 students
368 in them. There are 40 schools, attended by
[87] 160 pupils. The schools are attended only in winter, and the number of pupils changes every year.

In Khodzhent there are 202 mosques altogether, of which 47 are large mosques, holding public prayers on Fridays. The number of clergy in the mosques is 232. Within the town line there are 15 cemeteries.

Ura-Tyube

361 Legends about the foundation and early
103 history of the town of Ura-Tyube are not preserved among its inhabitants. It is only known that the town is ancient and before the dissemination of Islam among the Central Asian inhabitants, it was called Istyarau-shan. The name Ura-Tyube, or more precisely, Ora-tepe, was given the town only later, as a result of the fact that it lies partly in a hollow, and partly on an elevation;('ora' means hole and
361 'tepe' means elevation.) During the constant internecine wars which went on in this region Ura-Tyube and the villages in its region sometimes passed into the hands of the Emir of Bukhara, sometimes to the Khan of Kokand, and

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
Turkestan RL1

endorse this idea as a token of loyalty to the régime. Even the highest representative of the intellectual life of Soviet Central Asia, the rector of the Central Asiatic University in Tashkent, Sultan Umarov, had to make the following statement: 'The whole Uzbek people, young and old, will remember for all time that it owes its achievements to the party of Lenin and Stalin, to its elder brother, the Russian people, and to the leader and teacher of the nations – the great Stalin'.[6]

Representatives of other Central Asiatic peoples had to express their political creed in almost identical terms. The great pioneer role of the Russians in Central Asia is indeed undeniable, but the slogan of the Russian 'elder brother' implies more than a recognition of this pioneer work, it expresses servility and self-effacement on the part of the peoples who use it, and subordination of the rich history of the Central Asiatic peoples to Russian history which, as far as Central Asia is concerned, began only in the nineteenth century.

A very important aspect of the 'elder brother' theory is that in Central Asia his is not a temporary function which might come to an end at some later date. With the further economic development of Soviet Central Asia the 'elder brother' will become increasingly indispensable, because the Central Asiatic peoples by themselves are unable to reach the target figures fixed for them by Stalin's five-year plans. They are also incapable of producing from their own people the technical and educational *cadres* necessary for the implementation of these plans. This inability is in part due to the failure of Soviet schools to turn out adequate numbers of qualified personnel from amongst the local population. In addition, it is true to say that some of the Central Asiatic peoples are numerically too small to master the tasks assigned to their national republics by the centre even under the most perfect educational system.

The step from illiteracy to literacy, itself won with difficulty, was easy in comparison with the next objective, namely, the training of a native intelligentsia worthy of the name and capable of replacing the Russians in the key positions they now occupy in Central Asiatic economy. Various causes account for this. In the first place, it proved to be extremely difficult to keep the sons and daughters of steppe peoples for years under a rigid school discipline. In many cases the decree on compulsory school attendance remained a dead letter.* Secondly, there is an acute shortage of qualified teachers in Soviet Central Asia; the majority

* In the Karakalpak A.S.S.R. of Uzbekistan 24,000 children of school age, presumably the majority of all children in this republic, did not have any education in 1942–3.[7] As late as 1947, according to the admission of the organ of Soviet trade unions, more than 150,000 school children of Uzbekistan did not attend school.[8] In Kirghizistan 25 per cent of school children did not go to school in the rural districts of the republic, while an even larger number had failed to attend schools in the Kirghiz towns at the end of the first term of 1947.[9]

T. of the teaching staffs, including headmasters, have no proper training in
871 methods of tuition and quite frequently not even a secondary school
555 training. Finally, higher demands are made upon a young Uzbek,
[191] Kirghiz or Kazakh than upon a young Russian who wishes to engage
S.U. in a scientific or technical career. The former must have a complete
871 command of both his own and the Russian language and culture when
563 trying for a higher post, whereas for the Russian the knowledge of his
555 mother tongue is sufficient. A knowledge, however slight, of another language is a valuable asset, but not a condition, for his successful career. Many gifted Central Asiatics do not qualify for higher technical education because of their insufficient knowledge of Russian. Without a perfect knowledge of Russian, the young Central Asiatic is debarred from qualifying for attendance not only at higher educational institutes in Moscow and Leningrad, but even at some of the better medical and technical high schools in his own republic where Russian still remains the language of teaching, despite all the cultural progress made by the
S.U. Central Asiatic peoples under the Soviet régime. The recognition of the
563 Russians as the 'elder brother' also implies the recognition of certain
554 privileges for them. Thus the 'Russian brother' occupies many important
T. key positions in all Central Asiatic Republics, he dominates the local
563 ministries for internal affairs and state security, he provides the person-
554 nel for the office of the local public prosecutor, he is in charge of state banking and economic planning. Any criticism of this Russian colonization is out of the question since it would contradict the basic rules of 'family affection'.

T. The Russians living in the various Central Asiatic Republics are even
[517] entitled to join hands for common cultural tasks while the Central Asiatic peoples, as we have seen, are kept apart as much as possible. Thus in May 1948, a conference of Russian writers of Central Asia met in Tashkent. The conference dealt amongst other things with the help which Russian authors were to give to Russian theatres throughout Central Asia.[10]

Having stressed in principle the paramount importance of the Russian factor in Soviet Central Asia, we can now discuss the problems of the
Ka. Central Asiatic Soviet Republics in detail. We start with Kazakhstan,
101 which, from a purely geographical point of view, is only partly situated in Central Asia, but which politically and ethnographically is inseparably linked with the other four Central Asiatic Republics.

I. KAZAKHSTAN

Kazakhstan covers a territory of over 1,000,000 square miles and stretches from the Volga delta to the Chinese border. It is the mineral
000 storehouse of the Soviet Union. It ranks first in the world for its